The relevant million dollar question is how a terrorist group can be worshiped and summoned when the United States has also classified several of the members of the Taliban government as terrorists. In addition, the US strategy of containing terrorism originating in Rawalpindi could become much more hoarse and strident, which would cause a new wedge in relations between Islamabad and Washington.
With great power comes great responsibility. This secular maxim is a relevant poseur in front of the American defense and the strategic dispensation in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. Americans call their humanitarian and democratic zeal in Afghanistan part of their super-cop and regulator stature imbued with yeomanly and philanthropic verve. Undeniably, there is an iota of value-laden foreign policy analysis grounded in what’s going on across global politics and regional dynamics in South Asia. One can also cite, as a concomitant strategic constraint, the failure of America to justify the long war, with regard to the American presence in Afghanistan after September 11. President Joe Biden organized the US withdrawal from the Twilight Zone combat posts, but it was not his personal decision. The decision to make the exit had already been taken by President Donald Trump, where an agreement was reached with the marauding Taliban that Afghanistan will not be skillfully used as a springboard for terrorist attacks against the American homeland. President Biden has only followed the rhetoric by persisting in the White House’s decision to evacuate US interests from Afghanistan as the culmination of a mission.
The question we need to think about is: is this the kosher time to leave Afghanistan? And are critics right when they claim that when the United States of America failed to neutralize the Taliban during a two-decade “long occupation” and the “long war” that ensued? result, could they have made a difference in the political and security scenario after the collapse of the Kabul state forces without making any semblance of aggression and resistance.
Now, in the aftermath of IS Kohorasan’s planned losses of US marines at Kabul airport, will Washington carry out a mission as they did in 2014 in Iraq when the power vacuum had been surreptitiously there? occupied by the Islamic State and its novae dictum of territorial domination. One opinion argues that the United States could have negotiated with the Taliban in Qatar and continued to aid and encourage the battle in the twilight zone of Afghanistan. The American presence was required because it reduced the influence and the rise of the infamous Islamic State (ISIS). American interests could have stayed until the Taliban threat was completely eradicated. With Pakistan’s strategic depth west of the contested Durand Line, it was difficult for the United States to overthrow the Taliban juggernaut. The excruciatingly high pace of a week in which Mullah Baradar’s men overtook the entire nation was not sufficiently anticipated by US think tanks and the US Fourth Estate. The U.S. denomination expected the fall of the Taliban in two to three months, but the mind-bogglingness of the long war’s climax has left even the most hardened analysts bewildered by the Taliban’s high-profile military spectacle in the face of defense. transmitted by the ANSF supported by NATO and the United States.
Now that the Taliban have emerged triumphant in Kabul and beyond the capital, what can we learn from the role-play of the Americans? While it would be too much of a stretch to compare the American withdrawal to the dirty war, that is, the American intervention in Vietnam, the American determination has not been as adamant and stealthy as expected. when the result of the American opposition-say is there to be seen and captioned by everyone. America should either rebalance its ties with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in light of Prime Minister Imran Khan shamelessly wishing the ascendancy of the Taliban as well as the friendships of its ISI leader with the Taliban. As Pakistan has always enjoyed frontline state status for the United States, there can be a repeat of the ’80s and’ 90s when Americans rarely asked Pakistan about their efforts to support the Taliban’s staunch Frankenstein.
The United States will have its work cut out for it as the New Delhi waiver will highlight the new camaraderie that has been created between the Taliban and Chinese President Xi Jinping. For the past two years, a few Taliban negotiators have visited Beijing and it seems that the crown of the Sino-Taliban bond is unfolding, the Taliban have promised China not to let Afghanistan become a springboard for anti-forces. Chinese. The Taliban promissory note claims that the Taliban will not allow ETIM (Islamic Movement of East Turkestan) to instigate insidious acts of separatism and insurgency in China’s turbulent Xinxiang province and the Taliban have also expressed a desire to ‘Invite the OBOR and BRI initiative similar to CPEC in Pakistan to take over development and growth in Afghanistan. America can be assaulted by terrorist attacks as it is widely believed that the Taliban have well-defined ties to al-Qaeda who can use Afghan space as a platform and forum for planning and executing ministries against the American homeland. as they did twenty years ago. at the behemoth of the World Trade Towers, according to US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. President Biden also launched intoxicating rhetoric when he vowed to avenge the deaths of US marines at Kabul airport by declaring: âWe will not stand still. The perpetrators of the American losses will be dealt with diligently, diligently and immediately â.
C Rajamohan artfully states and analyzes in Foreign Policy magazine that âThe withdrawal of all American troops from Afghanistan is likely to accelerate current trends in India’s relations with the United States, China and Russia: greater cooperation with Washington, deeper conflicts with Beijing, and wider cracks in the traditional strategic partnership with Moscow. Pakistan’s changing relationship with the United States, China, and Russia reinforces these structural changes – and their mirror image.
Thus, it is destined to witness some insanity against the backdrop of systemic and structural changes as it relates to India and the United States. The proximity of the Indian state of Kashmir to Kabul and the rekindled ambition of Pakistan could bring the White House and New Delhi closer together as it is the United States’ own saying, GWOT, (Global War on Terror), which is linked to take a new violent turn in the near future.
In addition, the US strategy of containing terrorism originating in Rawalpindi could also become much more hoarse and strident, which would cause a new wedge in relations between Islamabad and Washington. The White House must realize that India will be affected by the jihad of Taliban-occupied Afghanistan, although the Taliban have promised otherwise. The relevant million dollar question is how a terrorist group can be worshiped and summoned when the United States has also classified several of the members of the Taliban government as terrorists. Can Americans trust a nation whose cabinet ministers ride in SUVs and carry guns to meetings in the Presidential House with the intoxicating rolls of bullets on fire. This brings us back to the efforts of Jaswant Singh during the hijacking of the Indian airliner to Kandahar.
The same game goes back to the classic big game, but it is very obvious that if the factory and the terror enterprise go badly in Afghanistan, the United States may have to rethink a “resumption” of intervention in order to stem an attack. conflagration in South Asia. And is this an unfulfilled mission, when it comes to the rebuilding and nation-building responsibilities of the United States?
(The writer teaches in international relations and international organizations, IIPA, New Delhi)